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FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
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INFO RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA IMMEDIATE 8965
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RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 8788
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE 3929
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 3349
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 002492

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2015
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PTER](#) [PINS](#) [NP](#)
SUBJECT: CPN-UML LEADER: DIALOGUE, NOT ALLIANCE, WITH
MAOISTS

REF: A. KATHMANDU 2384 (EXDIS-NOTAL)

[1](#)B. KATHMANDU 2400

[1](#)C. KATHMANDU 2388 (EXDIS-NOTAL)

Classified By: Amb. James F. Moriarty, Reason 1.4 (b/d)

Summary

[1](#)1. (C) In a November 15 meeting with CPN-UML General Secretary Madhav Kumar Nepal, the Ambassador emphasized that

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the USG was not against dialogue between the political parties and the Maoists with the goal of bringing the Maoists into the political mainstream. While not clearly admitting or denying that his party had initialed an agreement (ref A) with the Maoists, the CPN-UML leader refuted reports that his party had formed an alliance with the Maoists and claimed that it would not do so unless the Maoists renounced violence. He argued that CPN-UML was engaged in a dialogue with the Maoists in an attempt to transform the latter's ideological thinking and bring them into the political mainstream. He said he was encouraged by recent contacts with the Maoists, believing that the Maoist leadership, or at least Baburam Bhattarai, understood that the Maoists were losing political support and thus needed to seek a political solution. MK Nepal requested support from the international community in monitoring any resulting peace process, explaining that the political parties knew that they needed guarantees as the Maoists might be bluffing. He admitted that the Parties could only enter the villages and districts if the Maoists allowed them to. His party planned to hold demonstrations against the King's autocratic actions in the five regions beginning November 19 and culminating about December 5 in Kathmandu. End Summary.

Dialogue, Not Alliance

12. (C) The Ambassador underlined to CPN-UML General Secretary Madhav Kumar Nepal that the USG did not oppose dialogue between the political parties and the Maoists, but also strongly supported the political parties' assertion that they would not enter into an alliance with the Maoists while the latter still engaged in violence. The Ambassador explained that, in addition to the obvious dangers of being ultimately devoured by the Maoists, such an alliance could cost the Parties domestic political support. It could also provide grounds to the Palace to take action against UML as an organization that was cooperating with a totalitarian movement using violence to overthrow the government. MK Nepal was categorical in asserting that CPN-UML would not form an alliance with the Maoists until the latter renounced violence. He clarified that, at this time, they were only engaged in a dialogue. Abandoning talk of an alliance, MK Nepal cited the UML Ninth Central Committee meeting September decision to pursue a policy of "dialogue, struggle and transformation" with the Maoists as the basis for his party's actions.

Give Maoists Space, Time to Transform

13. (C) MK Nepal stated that he wanted to give the Maoists "the benefit of the doubt." He also believed that the Maoist leadership, specifically Baburam Bhattarai, had realized that the Maoists have not been able to win the support of the people. The "people's revolts" in Dailekh and elsewhere over the summer had made them realize something was wrong and they recognized they had alienated the people. Given this recognition, MK Nepal hoped that the Maoists would transform their thought and genuinely accept multi-party democracy. He acknowledged that they would not change their actions or tactics until this change had occurred, and he wanted to give them the time and space to allow for this "transformation."

But Still Worried By Maoists

14. (C) Admitting the strong possibility that the Maoists could be engaging in dialogue as part of a ploy to further their objectives, MK Nepal called on the international community to monitor and verify both the process to reach an understanding with the Maoists as well as any resulting peace process. He discounted the possibility of India or the EU playing a monitoring role, insisting the UN should do so. He explained that the international community needed to get involved to act as a guarantor in case the Maoists violated their commitments. MK Nepal suggested that the Maoists would have to hand over their weapons if they reached an agreement about elections for a constitutional assembly. He also noted that if the Maoists chose to join the interim government that would organize elections to a constitutional assembly, they would have to surrender their arms at that point. He added, however, that Maoist participation in an interim government could be problematic. At all junctures, the international community could help determine whether the Maoists had resorted to their old practices of using violence.

15. (C) MK Nepal said that the Maoist threat was still alive and well. He recognized that the Maoists could prevent the Parties from entering the villages and mobilizing the people. He indicated that was one of the reasons his party was engaged in a dialogue with the insurgents. He explained that the Maoist army was a force that could continue to intimidate and threaten local villages. MK Nepal reported that the degree of Maoist interference in party activities varied from district to district and that his party still encountered difficulties, including abductions, in some places.

Maoist Cease-fire to Continue?

16. (C) The CPN-UML leader said that his party had encouraged the Maoists to continue the cease-fire, but he was unsure whether they would do so. He noted that the increased

domestic and international sympathy that the Maoists gained from their unilateral cease-fire outweighed any physical losses they may have suffered. Noting he had no specific information on Maoist intentions, he speculated that if there were no municipal elections, the Maoists might extend their cease-fire; or, if a fully-empowered multi-party government were put in place, the Maoists might move to an indefinite cease-fire.

Possibility of Reconciliation with the Palace?

¶17. (C) The Ambassador urged MK Nepal to explore talks with the King, if the King reached out to the political parties. MK Nepal only acknowledged that there "needed to be some kind of balance" (implying that the Parties would need to balance their relations with the Maoists with their relations with the Palace), but would not commit to anything more. The Ambassador pointed out that the international community would support elections only if they could be credible, which seemed doubtful in the current environment. He cautioned, however, that the international community would never condone Maoist assassination attempts against candidates. (Note: UML Acting General Secretary Bamdev Gautam said in a late October interview that the Maoists would make candidates in the elections "six inches shorter." End Note.)

Party Plans Regional Demonstrations

¶18. (C) MK Nepal set forth his party's plans for the near future. In addition to continuing to review Maoist documents to determine their intentions and pulsing district cadres for their experiences and suggestions, the party would hold demonstrations against the King's autocratic rule in the regional areas. MK Nepal expected at least 50,000 cadres to participate in each. He outlined the schedule: November 19 in Butwal (in the west); November 26 in Pokhara (also in the west); November 28 in Janakpur (near the Indian border in the Central region); December 2 in Biratnagar (in the east); and December 5 in Kathmandu. He also indicated that the Seven-Party Alliance would meet this month to discuss mobilizing in Kathmandu.

Comment

¶19. (C) On November 14, MK Nepal had told reporters that the CPN-UML was ready to surrender their weapons under UN supervision if there were consensus about constituent assembly elections; the Maoists have thus far been silent on the issue. In private, MK Nepal was not as positive about Maoist intentions, requesting the international community's involvement. A November 16 editorial in the English-language daily "The Kathmandu Post" suggested that Maoist leaders should speak for themselves rather than through CPN-UML leaders.

¶10. (C) MK Nepal seemed uncomfortable at times and evaded many of the Ambassador's questions. He seemed to have gotten our message, however, as he remained firm on the point that his party would not enter into an alliance with the Maoists until they renounced violence. He is looking for some kind of way out, and seeing no signs from the Palace, is looking to the Maoists and grasping at straws.

MORIARTY